

## Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY LONDON

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FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 008946 ACTION NATO 14 JAN REPEATED  
LISBON 14 JAN

QUOTE

S E C R E T STATE 008946

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AO, US, NATO

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MATERIALS ON OAU AND ANGOLA FOR  
AMBASSADOR BRUCE

HOLD FOR OPENING OF BUSINESS FOR AMBASSADOR BRUCE

1. DURING JANUARY 14 NAC DISCUSSION OF ANGOLA YOU MAY  
DRAW ON FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF THE ANGOLAN SITUATION.
2. FYI YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT BRITISH ARE INSTRUCTED TO  
MAKE MAJOR STATEMENT ON ANGOLA IN NAC.
3. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR AT THE OUTSET THAT PRIMARY U.S.  
CONCERN, WHICH SHOULD BE OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO OTHER NATO  
MEMBERS, IS NOT WHAT GOVERNMENT EVENTUALLY EMERGES IN  
ANGOLA. RATHER WHAT WE FACE IS A MASSIVE SOVIET INTER-  
VENTION IN AFRICA OVER 8000 MILES FROM ITS OWN BORDERS,  
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WELL OUTSIDE ITS TRADITIONAL AREA OF SECURITY INTEREST. CONSERVATIVELY THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED \$200 MILLION WORTH OF ARMS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH IS MORE THAN WAS DELIVERED TO ALL OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, FROM ALL SOURCES, DURING THE CALENDAR YEAR 1974. THIS HARDWARE IS SUPPLEMENTED AND PARTLY MANNED BY AT LEAST 7500 CUBAN TROOPS WHICH

MARKS, AS PRESIDENT KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA HAS POINTED OUT, THE FIRST TIME THAT FOREIGN TROOPS HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED IN INDEPENDENT AFRICA. IF THE WEST ACCEPTS THIS DEVELOPMENT AND ALLOWS IT TO GO UNCHALLENGED ANY THREATENED AREA IN THE FUTURE WILL HAVE TO SUCCEED TO SOVIET FORCE OR THREAT OF FORCE, WHETHER OR NOT IT EVENTUALLY BECOMES INDEPENDENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE. (FYI THIS IS THE MAIN THEME OF U.S. CONCERN AND SHOULD BE REITERATED AT END OF YOUR PRESENTATION. END FYI)

4. OAU SUMMIT. LAST MINUTE EFFORTS TO RECONCILE PRO- AND ANTI- MPLA FACTIONS FAILED TO PRODUCE A CLOSING STATEMENT WHICH AT ONE POINT CALLED FOR:

--A CEASE-FIRE

--CONDEMNATION OF ALL FOREIGN INTERVENTION; AND

--FORMATION OF A SIX-MEMBER RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE.

THE PRO-MPLA HARDLINERS--NIGERIA, ALGERIA, MOZAMBIQUE, AND GUINEA--FIERCELY RESISTED THOSE POINTS AND THE TWO SIDES COULD ONLY AGREE TO

--STRENGTHEN AFRICAN UNITY;

--CONDEMN THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVASION; AND

--DECLARE ANGOLA AN AFRICAN PROBLEM TO BE SETTLED BY AFRICANS.

IN FINAL ANALYSIS THE TWO SIDES COULD NOT AGREE EVEN ON THIS NARROW COMMON GROUND AND ADJOURNED WITHOUT ANY  
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FORMAL AGREEMENT.

THE CUBAN DELEGATION IN ADDIS ABABA REPORTEDLY PLAYED A CRUCIAL ROLE IN STIFFENING THE RESISTANCE OF THE PRO-MPLA GROUP AGAINST A COMPROMISE. ACCORDING TO THE SAME SOURCE, THE CUBANS WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN MAKING THE DECISION TO LET THE CONFERENCE BREAK DOWN.

OAU ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL ONU TOLD EMBASSY ADDIS ABABA OFFICIALS THAT MPLA PARTISANS MAY BE PREPARING TO BLAME THE US FOR THE BREAKDOWN. OTHER REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE PRO-MPLA GROUP WILL CONTINUE TO WORK ACTIVELY TO SECURE GREATER RECOGNITION FOR THE LUANDA REGIME.

5. POST-SUMMIT DEVELOPMENTS. FUTURE OAU INTENTIONS REGARDING ANGOLA ARE HIGHLY UNCERTAIN. IN ANNOUNCING ADJOURNMENT OF SUMMIT, OAU CHAIRMAN AMIN DECLARED THAT BUREAU FOR 12TH OAU SUMMIT (THE NINE VICE PRESIDENTS ELECTED AT LAST JULY'S KAMPALA SUMMIT) WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE ANGOLA QUESTION. ALL BUT ONE OF NINE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED ON THE BUREAU RECOGNIZE THE MPLA.

WHILE PRO- AND ANTI- MPLA RANKS HELD FIRM THERE MAY BE SOME EROSION ON BOTH SIDES.

--TANZANIA, SOMALIA, AND ZAMBIA UNSUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT A MIDDLE GROUND COMPROMISE, AND WERE CHAGRINED AT THE OUTCOME;

--ETHIOPIA PLAYED AN IMPORTANT CONCILIATORY ROLE DURING THE MEETING BUT MAY NOW CONSIDER RECOGNIZING THE MPLA;

--UPPER VOLTA AND TOGO ARE CONSIDERED POSSIBLE EARLIER DEFECTORS TO THE MPLA;

--THE PRESIDENTS OF SOMALIA, TANZANIA, AND MOZAMBIQUE MET IN MOGADISCIO TO DISCUSS FUTURE PLANS IN WHAT MAY EMERGE AS A NEW FACTION WITHIN THE OAU.

6. IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN POLICY. IT IS STILL EARLY TO DRAW ANY HARD CONCLUSIONS FROM AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON OAU SUMMIT. MOST STRIKING AND ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT, HOWEVER, SECRET

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WAS WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY OF MODERATE AFRICAN STATES TO STAND UP TO MPLA STEAMROLLER. EFFECT OF STANDOFF IS TO LEAVE EARLIER DECISION OF OAU RECONCILIATION COMMISSION NOT TO RECOGNIZE ANY OF THE FACTIONS ESSENTIALLY INTACT, DESPITE EXPECTATIONS THAT MPLA SUPPORTERS WOULD OBTAIN OAU DECISION TO RECOGNIZE MPLA.

WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE ON IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE. MUCH WILL DEPEND, OF COURSE, ON ABILITY OF MODERATES TO MAINTAIN UNITED FRONT AGAINST ANTICIPATED MPLA EFFORTS TO OBTAIN FURTHER RECOGNITION, AND ON ABILITY OF PARTICULARLY UNITA FORCES TO WITHSTAND ANTICIPATED MILITARY ASSAULT (SEE BELOW). FOLLOWING ARE AMONG SOME OF MORE LIKELY TRENDS:

--DEEPENED POLARIZATION BETWEEN RADICALS AND MODERATES IN OAU AS A WHOLE;

--SOME BOOST IN MORALE TO MODERATES AND TO FNLA/UNITA LEADERSHIP;

--ENCOURAGEMENT TO MORE RESPONSIBLE LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES TO RETHINK THEIR POSITIONS, AND RENEWED EFFORTS BY SOME STATES TO BRIDGE THE WIDENING GAP.

--POSSIBLE TREND OF SOME MODERATES TO RECOGNIZE HUAMBO REGIME, BUT LARGER TREND TO RECOGNIZE LUANDA MPLA.

TO THE EXTENT THAT MODERATE FACTION DOES NOT BREAK-UP UNDER RADICAL PRESSURE AND PERSUASION, AND FNLA AND PARTICULARLY MORE RESISTANT UNITA FORCES DO NOT DISINTEGRATE, MODERATE AFRICAN STATES AND THE WEST WILL HAVE SOME LEVERAGE TO USE IN SUPPORT OF A COMPROMISE SOLUTION. U.S. POSITION REMAINS ONE OF FIRM SUPPORT FOR CEASE FIRE, WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS AND EFFORT TO FORM REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN ANGOLA. TO ACHIEVE THESE AIMS, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER WE ARE ABLE TO SHOW CREDIBLE FIRMNESS IN ANGOLA, AND WHETHER THE USSR CAN BE MADE TO SEE THAT ITS LARGER INTERESTS REQUIRE THAT THE ANGOLAN CRISIS BE ENDED ON A COMPROMISE BASIS. SECRETARY KISSINGER WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY WHEN HE GOES TO MOSCOW

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TO SEE WHETHER THERE IS ANY SUBSTANCE TO THE HINTS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET POSITION WHICH WE HAVE RECEIVED BOTH IN THE PRESS AND IN CONTACTS WITH LOWER-LEVEL SOVIET OFFICIALS.

7. IT APPEARS TO US THAT NOW IS A TIME WHEN WESTERN STATES SHOULD MAKE THEIR INFLUENCE FELT BOTH IN MOSCOW AND IN AFRICA IN A DISCREET BUT FIRM WAY. THE MODERATES MUST BE SEEN TO BE DOING THEIR OWN THING, NOT PLAYING A ROLE ASSIGNED THEM BY THE WEST. BUT THEY ALSO REQUIRE SOME QUIET ENCOURAGEMENT IF BEGINNING OF A MEANINGFUL MODERATE BLOC IN OAU IS TO SET DOWN DEEPER ROOTS.

#### 8. MILITARY SITUATION

IN NORTHERN ANGOLA, ALL FNLA AND ZAIRIAN MILITARY RESISTANCE HAS COLLAPSED, AND MPLA, HEAVILY SUPPORTED BY CUBAN TROOPS, IS ADVANCING RAPIDLY TOWARD THE ZAIRIAN BORDER. SINCE ITS CAPTURE OF CARMONA (UIGE) TWO WEEKS AGO, MPLA HAS OCCUPIED THE COAST AS FAR NORTH AS AMBRIZETE, JUST 150 KILOMETERS FROM THE BORDER. VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE

FNLA AND ZAIRIAN FORCES ARE FLEEING TO ZAIRE, AND THE ONLY MAJOR TOWN STILL UNDER THEIR NOMINAL CONTROL IS SAN ANTONIO DO ZAIRE AT THE MOUTH OF THE ZAIRE RIVER.

IN EASTERN ANGOLA, THE SOUTH AFRICAN-SUPPORTED UNITA TASK FORCE FAILED IN ITS EFFORTS TO SECURE THE EASTERN STRETCH OF THE BENGUELA RAILROAD AND TO OCCUPY THE MPLA'S EASTERN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS AT HENRIQUE DE CARVALHO. SOUTH AFRICAN ARTILLERY AND SUPPORT UNITS WITHDREW FROM COMBAT ON JANUARY 1-2 IN PREPARATION FOR THEIR EVENTUAL EVACUATION TO NAMIBIA. THE UNITA TASK FORCE SUBSEQUENTLY STAGED A "STRATEGIC WITHDRAWAL" TO MORE DEFENSIBLE POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS AROUND SILVA PORTO.

THE AREA SOUTH OF LUANDA ALONG THE COAST APPEARS TO BE THE MOST LIKELY SCENE FOR THE MPLA AND CUBAN FORCES

WHICH APPEAR TO BE POSITIONING THEMSELVES FOR AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE UNITA POLITICAL AND MILITARY HEADQUARTERS AT NOVA LISBOA (HUAMBO) IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS.

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THERE IS STILL NO FIRM INDICATION AS TO WHETHER SOUTH AFRICA INTENDS TO GO AHEAD WITH ITS REPORTED PLAN TO DISENGAGE COMPLETELY FROM THE CONFLICT. PREVIOUS CLANDESTINE REPORTING HAD INDICATED THAT IT WOULD WITHDRAW IF THE OAU SUMMIT SPECIFICALLY CENSURED ITS INTERVENTION, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW SOUTH AFRICA WILL INTERPRET THE DEADLOCK AT THE SUMMIT. ON JANUARY 13 RADIO JOHANNESBURG SAID SOUTH AFRICA "IS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW AS SOON AS THE THREAT OF RUSSIAN-BACKED AGGRESSION IS REMOVED."

THE MOVEMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL TO ANGOLA CONTINUES BY SEA AND AIR. LATEST ESTIMATES SUGGEST THAT AS MANY AS 7,500 TO 8,500 CUBAN TROOPS MAY NOW BE IN ANGOLA. KISSINGER

UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

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